Independent Action Verification Workflow
Rule 3 in practice: the agent that acts emits the action trace, a separate verification lane confirms the effect, and only a human closes the case.
Closing-proof workflow across detection, remediation and assurance: measure the fix rather than the reaction, rate the outage risk and refuse closure without evidence.
Copy and paste the following FlowZap code into a project in your FlowZap account to see this template diagram.
detection { # Detection
n1: circle label:"Start"
n2: rectangle label:"Inventory the real exposure"
n3: rectangle label:"Rank by observed exploitation"
n1.handle(right) -> n2.handle(left)
n2.handle(right) -> n3.handle(left)
n3.handle(bottom) -> remediation.n4.handle(top) [label="Prioritised estate"]
}
remediation { # Remediation
n4: rectangle label:"Deploy the patch"
n5: diamond label:"Patch applies"
n6: rectangle label:"Enable a temporary mitigation"
n7: rectangle label:"Log outcome and due date"
n4.handle(right) -> n5.handle(left)
n5.handle(right) -> n7.handle(top) [label="yes"]
n5.handle(bottom) -> n6.handle(top) [label="no"]
n6.handle(right) -> n7.handle(bottom) [label="mitigation"]
n7.handle(bottom) -> assurance.n8.handle(top) [label="Estate state"]
}
assurance { # Assurance
n8: rectangle label:"Replay the validation probe"
n9: diamond label:"Proof is machine-checkable"
n10: rectangle label:"Close with proof"
n11: circle label:"End"
n8.handle(right) -> n9.handle(left)
n9.handle(right) -> n10.handle(left) [label="yes"]
n10.handle(right) -> n11.handle(left)
n9.handle(bottom) -> human.n12.handle(top) [label="no"]
}
human { # Human
n12: rectangle label:"Approve or refuse closure"
n12.handle(top) -> assurance.n8.handle(bottom) [label="Recorded decision"]
}
Install the MCP packagenpm install -g flowzap-mcpMCP documentation
Rule 3 in practice: the agent that acts emits the action trace, a separate verification lane confirms the effect, and only a human closes the case.
Layer 1 of the agent containment stack: every tool call executes in an ephemeral container, and any path outside the workspace is denied and logged as a security event.
Layer 2 of the agent containment stack: a permission gate checks the whitelist and path scope before execution, and aborts the call with a logged denial when the scope does not match.
Layer 3 of the agent containment stack: dangerous tool calls are suspended and sent to a human reviewer, who approves or aborts the operation before anything executes.
Layer 4 of the agent containment stack: arguments are sanitized, secrets stripped and the action trace written to the SIEM before execution continues.
The full containment stack in one diagram: sandbox, permission gate, HITL approval and SIEM audit applied in sequence around a single dangerous tool call.