Agent Sandbox Containment Workflow
Layer 1 of the agent containment stack: every tool call executes in an ephemeral container, and any path outside the workspace is denied and logged as a security event.
The full containment stack in one diagram: sandbox, permission gate, HITL approval and SIEM audit applied in sequence around a single dangerous tool call.
Copy and paste the following FlowZap code into a project in your FlowZap account to see this template diagram.
agent { # Agent
n1: circle label:"User Prompt Received"
n2: rectangle label:"Agent Plans Tool Call"
n5: rectangle label:"Process Final Result"
n6: circle label:"Response to User"
n1.handle(right) -> n2.handle(left)
n2.handle(bottom) -> stack.n3.handle(top) [label="tool call"]
}
stack { # Containment Stack
n3: rectangle label:"L1 - Sandbox Ephemeral Container"
n4: rectangle label:"L2 - Whitelist Permission Check"
n7: diamond label:"Dangerous Operation?"
n8: rectangle label:"L3 - Human Approves"
n9: rectangle label:"Execute Tool"
n10: rectangle label:"L4 - Audit to Immutable SIEM"
n3.handle(right) -> n4.handle(left)
n4.handle(right) -> n7.handle(left)
n7.handle(right) -> n8.handle(left) [label="yes"]
n7.handle(bottom) -> n9.handle(top) [label="no"]
n8.handle(right) -> n9.handle(left)
n9.handle(right) -> n10.handle(left)
n10.handle(top) -> agent.n5.handle(bottom) [label="result"]
n5.handle(right) -> n6.handle(left)
}
Install the MCP packagenpm install -g flowzap-mcpMCP documentation
Layer 1 of the agent containment stack: every tool call executes in an ephemeral container, and any path outside the workspace is denied and logged as a security event.
Layer 2 of the agent containment stack: a permission gate checks the whitelist and path scope before execution, and aborts the call with a logged denial when the scope does not match.
Layer 3 of the agent containment stack: dangerous tool calls are suspended and sent to a human reviewer, who approves or aborts the operation before anything executes.
Layer 4 of the agent containment stack: arguments are sanitized, secrets stripped and the action trace written to the SIEM before execution continues.
Rule 3 in practice: the agent that acts emits the action trace, a separate verification lane confirms the effect, and only a human closes the case.
Consent is not a mandate: a third-party agent's requested scope is compared to the customer mandate before read-only access is granted, and every access event is audited.