Audit Logging & SIEM Containment Workflow
Layer 4 of the agent containment stack: arguments are sanitized, secrets stripped and the action trace written to the SIEM before execution continues.
Agent Mandate Scope Enforcement Workflow
Consent is not a mandate: a third-party agent's requested scope is compared to the customer mandate before read-only access is granted, and every access event is audited.
Full FlowZap Code
Copy and paste the following FlowZap code into a project in your FlowZap account to see this template diagram.
agent { # Third-party agent
n1: circle label:"Start"
n2: rectangle label:"Log in with customer credentials"
n3: rectangle label:"Request an action outside mandate"
n1.handle(right) -> n2.handle(left)
n2.handle(right) -> n3.handle(left)
n3.handle(bottom) -> access.n4.handle(top) [label="Out-of-mandate request"]
}
access { # Access control
n4: rectangle label:"Compare requested scope to mandate"
n5: diamond label:"Mandate covers the action"
n6: rectangle label:"Grant read-only access"
n7: circle label:"End"
n4.handle(right) -> n5.handle(left)
n5.handle(right) -> n6.handle(left) [label="yes"]
n6.handle(right) -> n7.handle(left)
n5.handle(bottom) -> audit.n8.handle(top) [label="no"]
}
audit { # Audit
n8: rectangle label:"Refuse and log the reason"
n8.handle(bottom) -> agent.n2.handle(bottom) [label="Motivated refusal"]
}
Install the MCP packagenpm install -g flowzap-mcpMCP documentation
Related templates
Four-Layer Agent Containment Stack
The full containment stack in one diagram: sandbox, permission gate, HITL approval and SIEM audit applied in sequence around a single dangerous tool call.
Independent Action Verification Workflow
Rule 3 in practice: the agent that acts emits the action trace, a separate verification lane confirms the effect, and only a human closes the case.
Agent Sandbox Containment Workflow
Layer 1 of the agent containment stack: every tool call executes in an ephemeral container, and any path outside the workspace is denied and logged as a security event.
Permission Gate Containment Workflow
Layer 2 of the agent containment stack: a permission gate checks the whitelist and path scope before execution, and aborts the call with a logged denial when the scope does not match.
HITL Approval Containment Workflow
Layer 3 of the agent containment stack: dangerous tool calls are suspended and sent to a human reviewer, who approves or aborts the operation before anything executes.